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Economic and Politico-Economic Equivalence 





We extend “economic equivalence” results, like the Ricardian equivalence proposition, to the 
political sphere where policy is chosen sequentially. We derive conditions under which a 
policy regime (summarizing admissible policy choices in every  period) and a state are 
“politico-economically equivalent” to another such pair, in the sense that both pairs give rise 
to the same equilibrium allocation. We apply  the conditions in the context of politico-
economic theories of government debt as a means to i) deliver intergenerational transfers or 
ii) smooth tax distortions. We find that certain politico-economic models of social security or 
variants thereof can be re-interpreted as novel politico-economic theories of debt while other 
models cannot, possibly explaining the political conflict surrounding social security reform. 
We  also  find that in environments with distorting taxes, economic equivalence relations 
between policies with different levels of debt do not extend to the political sphere. 
JEL-Code: E620, H550, H630. 
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Important results in public economics and macroeconomics establish equivalence classes of
\economically equivalent" exogenous policies that support the same equilibrium allocation
(conditional on an initial state). For example, in a simple model of household choice, poli-
cies relying on dierent combinations of consumption, capital-income and labor-income
taxes form equivalence classes, and in the standard overlapping-generations model, pay-
as-you-go social security policies are economically equivalent to certain policies relying on
taxes and explicit government debt.
In politico-economic models, the primitives of the analysis include policy regimes which
dene the admissible policy instruments available to political decision makers, rather than
policies which constitute equilibrium objects in these models. This raises the question
whether equivalence classes over policy regimes can be dened and if so, how these equiv-
alence classes relate to the economic equivalence classes dened over policies. An answer
to this question has important policy implications. Consider for example proposals to
\privatize" social security and debt nance the transition. From a narrow economic point
of view, shifting from a pay-as-you-go nanced social security regime to a regime with
taxes and explicit government debt could be irrelevant because specic pay-as-you-go and
tax-and-debt policies belong to the same economic equivalence class. From a politico-
economic point of view, however, one would expect that such a regime change could in
general alter the equilibrium allocation. In fact, this is what the observed disagreement
among policy makers concerned with the regime change question suggests.
The objective of this paper is to extend the economic equivalence concept to the
politico-economic sphere. We derive conditions under which a policy regime and a state
(consisting of an economic state and a political state, the latter reecting predetermined
policy instruments and possibly non-fundamental state variables supporting trigger strate-
gies) are \politico-economically equivalent" to another such pair in the sense that both
pairs support politico-economic equilibria and both these equilibria correspond with the
same allocation. And we consider several applications. While we focus on applications in
models with public debt, the theoretical conditions we obtain are general in nature and
apply in other contexts featuring an endogenous choice of policies.
Our theoretical results are derived within a dynamic framework with households, rms
and a government with access to general taxes, transfers as well as debt. In a rst step,
we extend well-known neutrality propositions (e.g., Barro, 1974; Sargent, 1987; Rangel,
1997; Coleman, 2000; Ghiglino and Shell, 2000; Bassetto and Kocherlakota, 2004; Niepelt,
2005) and derive a general economic equivalence result. Using this result, we derive in a
second step sucient conditions for politico-economic equivalence of two policy regimes
(conditional on the respective states).
Intuitively, these conditions specify requirements on the choice sets faced by political
decision makers. These choice sets are constrained by the state on the one hand and the
policy instruments under the control of political decision makers on the other. Accord-
ingly, the rst condition requires that state spaces must be comparable in the sense that
states can unambiguously be related across policy regimes. Verifying this condition may
not be immediate since policy instruments and commitment structures generally dier
2across regimes. The other two conditions which build on the rst requirement concern
the admissible policy instruments. The admissibility restrictions on those instruments
in the \new" regime must be both suciently loose and suciently tight: Suciently
loose for political decision makers in this new regime to be able to support competitive
equilibria that political decision makers in the \initial" regime choose to implement; and
suciently tight such that political decision makers in the new regime must not be able
to support competitive equilibria that cannot be supported in the initial regime.
The politico-economic equivalence conditions we derive serve several purposes. In
their general form, they constitute a useful tool for researchers interested in characteriz-
ing politico-economic equilibria. When high dimensional state and policy spaces render
such a task dicult, the equivalence conditions can help by allowing to relate the equi-
librium conditions of interest to their counterparts in a simpler setting that is easier to
characterize. In the applications we consider, the politico-economic equivalence conditions
help to identify factors that render government debt non-neutral from a political point of
view. We consider two roles of government debt: As a means to deliver intergenerational
transfers, and as a means to smooth tax distortions.
Regarding the former role, we start from the well-known fact that in overlapping
generations economies, certain social security policies and debt policies are economically
equivalent. Asking whether this equivalence extends to the political sphere, we contrast
existing politico-economic models of social security (Cooley and Soares, 1999; Tabellini,
2000; Boldrin and Rustichini, 2000; Forni, 2005; Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt, 2008) with
alternative models in which political decision makers may issue debt and choose the repay-
ment rate on maturing debt. We show that certain politico-economic theories of social se-
curity that have been proposed in the literature may be re-interpreted as politico-economic
theories of government debt, and our analysis therefore contributes to a small but growing
literature on debt in politico-economic equilibrium (e.g., Battaglini and Coate, 2008; D az-
Gim enez, Giovanetti, Marimon and Teles, 2008; Yared, 2010; Song, Storesletten and Zili-
botti, 2007; Niepelt, 2010).1 Other theories cannot be re-interpreted in that way. By
identifying factors that undermine politico-economic equivalence, our ndings can help
rationalize why interest groups might favor or oppose the privatization of social security
although from a purely economic point of view, a regime change appears irrelevant. This
might prove useful in constructing theories of social security reform.
More specically, the analysis identies three classes of overlapping generations mod-
els. First, a class characterized by minimal household heterogeneity and non distorting
taxes in which politico-economic equivalence between social security and debt regimes
holds for any political aggregation mechanism. Second, a class in which politico-economic
equivalence may or may not hold, depending on the political aggregation mechanism
in place. Equivalence may fail in this class because certain allocations are only imple-
mentable in the debt regime. Finally, a class of models with sucient heterogeneity among
households and without commitment. In models of this class, the debt ownership struc-
ture constitutes a non-trivial state variable and politico-economic equivalence generally
1Cukierman and Meltzer (1989) argue in a model with commitment that political decision makers are
indierent between social security and debt policies when the policy regime features both instruments
and allows for lump sum taxes.
3fails because states cannot unambiguously be related across policy regimes.
Regarding the tax smoothing role of government debt, we start from Bassetto and
Kocherlakota's (2004) observation that the timing of tax collections may be allocation
neutral even if taxes are distorting, as long as taxes may be levied on contemporaneous
and lagged incomes.2 We nd that this economic equivalence result does not extend to
the political sphere. A policy regime allowing for the taxation of current and lagged
income generally is not politico-economically equivalent to a regime allowing for taxation
of current income only.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out the model.
In Sections 3 and 4, we derive the economic and politico-economic equivalence results,
respectively. Section 5 contains the applications and Section 6 concludes with a discussion
of the implications for social security reform and the applicability of our results to a wider
class of policies.
2 The Economic Model
We consider an innite-horizon deterministic, discrete-time economy with time indexed
by t = 0;1;:::.3 The economy is inhabited by a government, rms (potentially including
an external sector), and households.
Let I denote the set of households, and let It  I denote the set of households alive
in period t. For any household i 2 I, let i1 and iT denote the rst period and last period
of household i's lifetime, respectively.





and consumption vectors, respectively, of household i in period t and let Xi
t  RL
+ denote
the household's consumption set. For example, ei
t might include household i's time en-
dowment, and xi
t might include consumption of leisure or goods. Household preferences
in period t are described by the function 
i
t : Xi
i1    Xi
iT ! R for all i 2 I with
i1  t  iT. Let xt denote the vector of consumption choices by all households i 2 It
in period t, and let xi denote the consumption prole of household i over i's lifetime.
Let bi
t denote household i's holdings of maturing government debt in period t and let ai
t
denote household i's nancial wealth net of government debt but including discounted
rm prots, if they exist (all in terms of the numeraire). Household i's total nancial
wealth, fi
t, is given by fi
t  ai
t + bi
tzt with zt denoting the repayment rate on government
debt, to be discussed below.






2;t) 2 R2L denote a production plan of
rm j 2 J in period t and let Y
j
t  R2L denote the production set of the rm in period
t. A production plan y
j
t lists rm j's net input-outputs in period t (the rst L elements,
corresponding to y
j
1;t) as well as the resulting net input-outputs at the beginning of the
2Bassetto and Kocherlakota (2004) extend Barro's (1974) Ricardian (economic) equivalence result to
environments with non-distorting taxes.
3The extension to the stochastic case is immediate. If the number of states in each period is nite,
and with some adjustments to notation, t can alternatively be interpreted as indexing histories.
4following period (the second L elements, corresponding to y
j
2;t).4 Given a predetermined
y
j




t+1;:::) constitutes a production path if yj
s 2 Y j
s for all s  t.






Let q and r denote the pre-tax prices in the economy. In particular, the vector qt
denotes the period-t prices of the L commodities in terms of the numeraire; and rt;s
denotes the period-t price of the numeraire in period s in terms of the numeraire in
period t, that is, the inverse of the gross interest rate between periods t and s, s  t. The
vector rt denotes the term structure of interest rates in period t, and tr denotes the term
structures of interest rates in periods preceding t.
It is useful to partition xi as xi = (txi;xi







iT). Vectors dened over all households as well as the prices q





t) denote the tax imposed on household i in period t, dened in
terms of the numeraire. Taxes may depend on the household's nancial wealth as well as
on its consumption choices and prices in the current or previous periods.5 They may also
depend on the household's endowments, but for ease of notation we do not list current or
past endowments as arguments of the tax function. Let gi  fgi
s()g
iT
s=i1 and denote the
proles of tax functions across households by g  fgigi2I.6 Examples of tax functions
gi
t() include labor income, consumption or capital income taxes. A proportional tax on







denote the tax rate, wage, and labor supply (that is, the time endowment minus leisure










t denoting the tax rate, price of the good,





t(1   rt 1;t) with k
t denoting the tax rate.
A government policy consists of a sequence of vectors of government purchases, pro-
les of tax functions imposed on rms, proles of tax functions imposed on households,
g, and sequences of government debt issuance and redemption (dened in terms of the
numeraire). Let bt+1 denote the amount of government debt issued in period t and ma-
turing in period t + 1, and let vt denote the price of debt at issuance.7 The policies we
consider dier with respect to the proles of tax functions imposed on households, g, as
well as the government debt policy (b;z), but not with respect to taxes imposed on rms
or government purchases. To simplify the notation, we therefore assume that the latter
two instruments are not employed at all. Accordingly, a policy p can be represented as
p = (g;(b;z)). Let pt denote the policy instruments applied under policy p in period t
4See Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995, ch. 20.C). For example, if the rm uses goods k and labor
l to produce new goods k0 (and if goods and labor are the only commodities), then y
j
t = ( k; l;k0;0).
5With sequential decision making of the form considered later, taxes cannot depend on future house-
hold choices.




all i;j 2 I.
7For simplicity, we only consider short-term debt.
5or later, pt  (gt;(b;z)t)  ffgi
s()gi2Is;(bs+1;zs)gst.
Let qt  (xi
t   ei
t) represent household i's net expenditure in period t before taxes and




















t    Xi
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that is households may freely save or borrow. By convention, (ai
t;bi
t) = (0;0) for i 2 I
with i1  t.
The economic state in period t comprises several objects. First, the state variables
resulting from production in the preceding period, fy
j
2;t 1gj2J. Second, households' asset
holdings. Third, past consumption choices and prices if these enter as arguments of





tgi2It; tx; tq; tr).
Denition 1. A competitive equilibrium as of period t conditional on t as well as pt,
denoted by CE(t;pt) for short, consists of prices (qt;qt;rt), household choices (xi
t;xit)
for all i 2 I with iT  t, and production paths ffyj
sgj2Jgst such that

















it) for all i 2 I with iT  t;
ii. production paths are optimal:
y
j






qs  ^ y
j
1;s + rs;s+1(qs+1  ^ y
j
2;s) for all j 2 J;s  t;














1;s) for all s  t;










s) = bszs   zs+1
rt;s+1
rt;s




t, as well as the no-Ponzi-game condition.
8For ease of notation, we do not list the household's endowments as arguments of the choice set.
6Three remarks are in order. First, the government budget constraint (2) uses the fact




for all s  t:
To simplify the notation, we do not include government debt prices in the denition of
competitive equilibrium.
Second, the competitive equilibrium conditions together with the budget set (1) de-
termine equilibrium net asset positions of households over time, fffi
sgi2Isgst+1, but not
the composition of households' portfolios, ffai
s;bi
sgi2Isgst+1, since the after-tax returns
on all assets are identical in equilibrium.
Finally, note from the denition of Bi
t() as well as from equation (2) that there exists
a continuum of debt quantities and repayment rates corresponding to a given equilibrium
allocation. In particular, consider the competitive equilibrium CE(t;pt) and let fsgst
be a sequence of strictly positive scalars. Then, the competitive equilibria CE(t;pt) and
CE(0
t;p0
t) coincide if the initial debt holdings fbi
tgi2It in t are replaced by ftbi
tgi2It in
0
t and the sequences fbs+1;zsgst in pt are replaced by the sequences fs+1bs+1;zs=sgst
in p0
t. We return to this issue later.
3 Economic Equivalence
This Section denes conditions under which pairs of policy instruments and state variables
support the same competitive equilibrium. Let i
t  (ai
t;bi
t; txi; tq; tr) denote the economic
state of individual i. Throughout the analysis, we disregard the possibility that a policy
supports multiple competitive equilibria.9




spectively, give rise to the same choice set for household i as of period t, conditional on





























t;zt) together with i




t) together with i0
t .
Proof. Immediate.
Lemma 1 states a \partial equilibrium indierence" condition at the level of an indi-
vidual household. For policy changes to be \irrelevant" in general equilibrium (as dened
in Denition 2 below), this partial equilibrium condition must hold for all households.
Moreover, it must be true that aggregate equilibrium conditions are equivalently satis-
ed under both policies. Assumption 1 and Proposition 1 below specify conditions under
which this is the case.
9This case could easily be handled by introducing a sunspot variable whose realization, conditional
on the policy choice, determines the equilibrium.
7Denition 2. An economic state and set of policy instruments, (t;pt), is economically
equivalent to another state and set of policy instruments, (0
t;p0
t), if
i. (t;pt) supports a competitive equilibrium CE(t;pt);
ii. (0
t;p0
t) supports a competitive equilibrium CE(0
t;p0
t);
iii. the two competitive equilibria are identical.
Assumption 1. Policy does not aect production sets.
Proposition 1. Consider an economic state and set of policy instruments, (t;pt), that
support a competitive equilibrium CE(t;pt), and consider a new economic state and set
of policy instruments, (0
t;p0
t). Suppose that 0
t and p0
t satisfy the following conditions:





2;t 1 for all j 2 J;
ii. at equilibrium prices, (t;pt) and (0
t;p0
t) imply identical choice sets for all house-
holds as of period t:
(3) holds in period t for all i 2 I with iT  t; (4)
iii. at equilibrium prices and quantities, 0
t and p0







































Then, under Assumption 1, (t;pt) is economically equivalent to (0
t;p0
t).
Proof. Consider the situation with (0
t;p0
t) and conjecture that prices (qt;qt;rt) remain
unchanged relative to CE(t;pt).10 Then, from Lemma 1 and condition (4), household
choices remain optimal under p0
t and the rst requirement of competitive equilibrium
is satised. From Assumption 1, rm choices continue to constitute production paths.
Since prices are unchanged, these choices also remain optimal such that the second re-
quirement of competitive equilibrium is satised. Due to unchanged predetermined net
input-outputs, the resource constraints continue to be satised and the third require-
ment of competitive equilibrium is met. From Equation (5), the new policy satises the
government budget constraints and the fourth requirement of competitive equilibrium is
satised.
We conclude that (0
t;p0
t) supports a competitive equilibrium that coincides with
CE(t;pt).
10Recall that debt prices are not included in the set of equilibrium objects.
8In the equilibrium supported by the new policy, government debt continues to pay




rt;s for all s  t. As a consequence, households
continue to be indierent between holding government debt or privately issued debt. To
nance their original consumption plans households adjust their savings in a period by the
amount corresponding to the dierential tax payments under the two policies. Summed
over all households, demand for government debt therefore matches supply.
Proposition 1 summarizes the Ricardian equivalence result and related neutrality the-
orems discussed in the literature. Consider for example a model of a representative agent
that values consumption and leisure, saves and borrows at the market interest rate, sells
labor and capital services to rms, purchases consumption goods from rms, and lends
funds to the government. This model satises Assumption 1, implying that tax collections
and government decits may be shifted over the entire horizon of the economy without
aecting the equilibrium allocation as long as the choice set Bt() of the representative
household remains unchanged. In particular, with non-distorting taxes, economic equiv-
alence of two scal policies (subject to initial states) only requires the present discounted
value of taxes to be the same across policies; this is the standard Ricardian equivalence
result (see Barro, 1974).
With overlapping generations of representative households rather than a single in-
nitely lived household, and under Assumption 1, Proposition 1 implies that a change in
the timing of tax collections and decits leaves the allocation unaected as long as the
choice set of each cohort remains unchanged. In particular, certain debt-and-tax poli-
cies are equivalent to pay-as-you-go nanced transfer policies. Consider for example an
environment with two-period lived overlapping generations. Let pt = (gt;(0;z)t) =
((;)t;(0;z)t) be a policy without explicit government debt that supports the competi-
tive equilibrium CE(t;pt). Here,  denotes social security contributions paid by workers
and   denotes benets paid to retirees. Let p0
t = ((0;0)t;(b0;z0)t) be another policy
with explicit government debt. Proposition 1 implies that (0
t;p0
t) is economically equiv-
alent to (t;pt) if 0
t and t have the same predetermined net input-outputs and if (4)
and (5) are satised. Letting Ir
t and Iw
t denote the sets of retirees and workers in period





































s ;s  t:





















for all s  t, where taxes are evaluated at equilibrium quantities and prices. Conditional
on appropriately dened states t and 0
t, any pay-as-you-go nanced social security policy
without explicit debt, ((;)t;(0;z)t), is therefore economically equivalent to policies
9relying on contributions, benets, and explicit debt, ((0;0)t;(b0;z0)t) (see, e.g., Sargent
(1987, ch. 8), Rangel (1997) and Niepelt (2005)). In particular, there exists such an
equivalent policy that involves no benets after period t.11
4 Politico-Economic Equivalence
Our aim in this Section is to establish conditions under which the economic equivalence
result of Proposition 1 extends to situations where policy is sequentially chosen to maxi-
mize some objective function. More specically, we are interested in the conditions under
which economic equivalence of two policies (subject to appropriately dened initial states)
implies that the second policy constitutes a politico-economic equilibrium if the rst pol-
icy does so. In line with the maintained assumption that policy does not enter household
preferences, we assume that the objective function maximized by political decision makers
does not depend on policy choices.
Assumption 2. The political objective function in period t is given by 
t(x).
Without loss of generality, we focus on the case where political decisions are taken in
every period.12 We assume that political decision makers act in the beginning of a period,
before the private sector. Let pt denote the policy choice by political decision makers in
period t that is, the choice of values for the policy instruments in pt that are under the
control of political decision makers in period t; let pt denote the continuation policy choice
by subsequent political decision makers; and let tp denote the choices by policy makers
in preceding periods (potentially including some initial values for policy instruments). A
policy p can then be partitioned as p = (tp;pt;pt).
Let Pt denote the set of admissible policy choices in period t. The restrictions embed-
ded in Pt specify the policy instruments under the control of political decision makers in
period t (and thus, the degree of commitment) as well as restrictions on the numerical
values of those instruments. A policy regime is dened by P 
Q
t Pt which can be parti-
tioned as P = (tP;Pt;Pt). The policy space in period t, Qt, is dened as the superset of
Pt that results if restrictions on the numerical values of the policy instruments in Pt are
dropped. The policy space Q 
Q
t Qt can be partitioned as Q = (tQ;Qt;Qt).
Recall from the discussion after Denition 1 that, if government debt constitutes a
policy instrument, there exists a continuum of debt quantities and repayment rates cor-
responding with a given set of prices, taxes, household choices and production paths.
Without loss of generality, we eliminate this indeterminacy when debt is a policy in-
strument by xing government debt per household or per retiree (or otherwise suitably
normalized) at some strictly positive exogenous sequence, f btgt0 > 0. Adopting this
11According to some authors, pay-as-you-go nanced social security policies are not equivalent to
policies relying on contributions, benets, and debt (see, e.g., Birkeland and Prescott, 2007). These
authors reach this dierent conclusion because they restrict the set of available policy instruments such
that condition (4) cannot be met.
12If political decisions are taken once and for all, economic equivalence trivially extends to the political
sphere. If political decisions are taken more than once, but not in every period, then the analysis in the
text applies if periods are redened appropriately.
10normalization does not constrain the eective choice set of policy makers|with  bt > 0,
the amount of resources transferred to bond holders can be controlled by the choice of
repayment rate|nor does it constrain the ownership structure of government debt and
thus, the relative exposure of dierent groups of households to public debt.
If political decision makers can commit to certain future policy instruments then some
of the policy instruments employed from period t onwards, pt, are predetermined. We
denote such predetermined policy instruments by tpt, implying pt = (tpt;pt;pt). The
predetermined policy instruments tpt include committed tax functions, fgic
t ()gi2It, that
are imposed on households in period t but are chosen by political decision makers in an
earlier period, and they include the repayment rate on contemporaneously maturing debt,
zt, if political decision makers can issue debt and commit to repay.
Let t denote the set of state variables in period t that determine (together with
P) which competitive equilibria are implementable. The elements contained in t are
fully described by t and tpt but they dier depending on the policy regime in place.
First, with explicit government debt but without commitment to debt repayment, t =
(t; tpt) = (t;ffgic
s ()gi2Isgst). In this case, the asset ownership structures fai
t;bi
tgi2It
(contained in t) are separately included in t because they determine the extent to which
political decision makers may aect the relative wealth positions of households by choosing
the repayment rate zt. Second, with explicit government debt and with commitment to
debt repayment, political decision makers cannot aect the nancial wealth of households




s ()gi2Isgst). Finally, in a setup
without government debt, t = (tnfbi
tgi2It;ffgic
s ()gi2Isgst) and bi
t (as well as  bt) equals
zero for all i 2 It and all t.13
By construction, the state variables contained in t and the policy choices pt 1 =
(pt;pt) completely characterize a competitive equilibrium. With some slight abuse of no-
tation, we can therefore denote a competitive equilibrium by CE(t;pt 1) rather than
CE(t;pt). Accordingly, we modify Denition 2 of economic equivalence. For conve-
nience, we also extend the Denition of economic equivalence to sets:
Denition 3. A state and sequence of policy choices, (t;pt 1), is economically equivalent
to another state and sequence of policy choices, (0
t;p
0t 1), if
i. (t;pt 1) supports a competitive equilibrium CE(t;pt 1);
ii. (0
t;p
0t 1) supports a competitive equilibrium CE(0
t;p
0t 1);
iii. the two competitive equilibria are identical.
13Leaving physical state variables aside, one might expect the state to summarize the cumulative
restrictions on households' budget sets as implied by policy choices in previous periods. These restrictions
would be given by the present value of those tax functions that are predetermined. This view is not
correct, for two reasons. First, the economic equilibrium conditions do not only include the net present
value of the predetermined tax functions (and the physical state variables) but also the contemporaneous
predetermined tax functions since these enter into the government's dynamic budget constraint. Second,
and more importantly, absent commitment to debt repayment, the ownership structure of debt also enters
the state (although it is in general not under the control of previous governments).
11A state and a set of sequences of policy choices, (t;fpt 1g), is economically equivalent to
another state and set of sequences of policy choices, (0
t;fp
0t 1g), if
i. for every pt 1 2 fpt 1g such that (t;pt 1) supports a competitive equilibrium, there
exists a p
0t 1 2 fp
0t 1g such that (t;pt 1) is economically equivalent to (0
t;p
0t 1);
ii. for every p
0t 1 2 fp
0t 1g such that (0
t;p
0t 1) supports a competitive equilibrium,
there exists a pt 1 2 fpt 1g such that (t;pt 1) is economically equivalent to (0
t;p
0t 1).
An admissible continuation policy choice pt 2 Pt is feasible conditional on t+1 if
pt supports a competitive equilibrium CE(t+1;pt). Let Pt(t+1)  Pt denote the set
of admissible and feasible continuation policy choices conditional on t+1. An admissible
policy choice pt 2 Pt is feasible conditional on t if there exists an admissible continuation
policy pt 2 Pt such that pt 1 = (pt;pt) supports a competitive equilibrium CE(t;pt 1).
Let Pt(t)  Pt denote the set of admissible and feasible policy choices conditional on
t. Every admissible and feasible continuation policy choice at time 0, p 1 = (p0;p0) 2
P 1(0), and the allocation it supports correspond with a sequence of the state, ftgt0.
This sequence need not be unique.14 Let Mt denote the set of values that the state may
take in period t across all such admissible and feasible continuation policy choices.
4.1 Fundamental State Variables
Sequential decision making implies that policy choices in period t are functions of the
economy's history. We assume that this history is only relevant insofar as it constrains
the set of competitive equilibria as of period t conditional on t that can be supported by
admissible continuation policies. (Below, we will relax this assumption and consider an
enlarged state space allowing for trigger strategies.) Accordingly, the state in the program
of political decision makers in period t is given by t, and the policy function pt() is a
mapping from Mt into
S
t2Mt Pt(t)  Pt. Similarly, a continuation policy function
pt() is a mapping from Mt+1 into
S
t+12Mt+1 Pt(t+1)  Pt. To streamline notation, we
dene continuation policy functions not only for t  0 but also for t =  1.
We are now ready to state the denition of politico-economic equilibrium.
Denition 4. A politico-economic equilibrium as of period t conditional on t 2 Mt
as well as policy regime P, denoted as PEE(t;P) for short, consists of a sequence of
policy functions fps()gst, a sequence of continuation policy functions fps()gst 1, pol-
icy choices p?t 1, prices (q?
t;q?t;r?
t), household choices (x?
t;x?t), and production paths
ffyj?
s gj2Jgst such that
i. policy functions are optimal subject to continuation policy functions:






s(s+1) for all s 2 Ms;s  t;
where (xs;xs) and s+1 correspond with CE(s;(ps;ps));
14The sequence is not unique if the cross section of asset holdings is indeterminate as might be the case
in a policy regime with debt and without commitment to debt repayment.
12ii. continuation policy functions are consistent with actual policy choices:
p
s 1(s) = (ps(s);p
s(s+1)) for all s 2 Ms;s  t;
where s+1 corresponds with CE(s;ps 1(s));








s gj2Jgst constitute CE(t;p?t 1).
Returning to the motivating question, consider an \initial" policy regime P with
associated politico-economic equilibrium PEE(0;P), and a \new" policy regime P0. We
are interested in conditions that, if satised, guarantee politico-economic equivalence as
specied in the following Denition:
Denition 5. A state and policy regime, (t;P), is politico-economically equivalent to
another state and policy regime, (0
t;P0), if
i. (t;P) supports a politico-economic equilibrium PEE(t;P) with policy choices
p?t 1;
ii. (0
t;P0) supports a politico-economic equilibrium PEE(0
t;P0) with policy choices
p
0?t 1;
iii. (t;p?t 1) is economically equivalent to (0
t;p
0?t 1).
Note that politico-economic equivalence is dened with respect to pairs of a state and
policy regime whereas economic equivalence was dened with respect to pairs of a state
and policy. This dierence arises because policy is exogenous in competitive equilibrium
but endogenous (and shaped by the policy regime) in politico-economic equilibrium.
A sucient condition for politico-economic equivalence is that the choice set of political
decision makers in the new regime satises two requirements. On the one hand, this choice
set must be suciently large in the sense that political decision makers in the new regime
can support those competitive equilibria that political decision makers in the initial regime
nd optimal to implement, on or o the equilibrium path. On the other hand, the choice
set in the new regime must not be too large. In particular, political decision makers in the
new regime must not be able to support competitive equilibria that cannot be supported
in the initial regime. If both requirements are satised, then political decision makers in
the new regime will implement policies that support the same competitive equilibrium as
in the initial regime.
Within the set of competitive equilibria that can be supported by the economic state
and the admissible policy instruments, the choice set of political decision makers is con-
strained by the political state, the admissibility restrictions on the policy instruments
under their own control, and the equilibrium behavior of subsequent political decision
makers. Accordingly, our politico-economic equivalence conditions impose cross-regime
13restrictions on the state and the policy spaces. Condition 1 stipulates that states can
unambiguously be related to each other across regimes, and Conditions 2 and 3 stipulate
that the admissibility restrictions on policy instruments render the choice set in the new
regime suciently large but not too large.
First, we dene a relation between states in dierent regimes.
Denition 6. For a state t 2 Mt in the policy regime P, an associated state 0
t in the
policy regime P0 satises
i. tp0
t is part of a tp0 2 tQ0;
ii. there exists a p
0t 1 2 Q




The set of states in the policy regime P0 that are associated with t 2 Mt is denoted
~ M0
t(t).
The rst part of Denition 6 requires that the predetermined policy instruments lie
in the policy space of the new regime. Similarly, the continuation policy choice p
0t 1 in
the second requirement in Denition 6 is constrained by the policy space Q0 and not by
the policy regime P0. That is, while the policy choices must contain policy instruments
available in the new regime, the numerical values of these instruments do not need to
satisfy the admissibility restrictions present in the new regime. If ~ M0
t(t) is empty for
some t, then the policy instruments in the new policy regime are not exible enough to
support the equilibrium allocation given t in the initial policy regime, even disregarding
numerical restrictions on the instruments.
Condition 1. The following holds true for all t:
i. M0
t  [t2Mt ~ M0
t(t);
ii. ~ M0
t(t) 6= ; for all t 2 Mt;
iii. if t; ^ t 2 Mt and CE(t;pt 1(t)) 6= CE(^ t;pt 1(^ t)) then ~ M0
t(t) \ ~ M0
t(^ t) = ;.
The rst part of Condition 1 requires that every state in the new policy regime can be
associated with a state in the initial regime, and the second part requires that for every
state in the initial regime, there is a state in the new regime that can be associated with
it. The third part of the Condition requires that a state in the new policy regime can be
associated with more than one state in the initial regime only if the latter induce identical
competitive equilibria.
We can then dene an equivalent continuation policy function ~ p
0t 1() that maps the
state 0




such that (t;pt 1(t)) is economically equivalent to (0
t; ~ p
0t 1(0
t)). Similarly, we can
dene an equivalent policy function ~ p0
t() that maps the state 0




t that corresponds to the time-t component of ~ p
0t 1(0
t). Both functions have
domain [t2Mt ~ M0
t(t). If policy instruments in the new policy regime are redundant then
14the equivalent continuation policy function and the equivalent policy function generally
are correspondences rather than functions. For simplicity, we disregard this possibility
when stating the following conditions.
Condition 2 formalizes the requirement that the choice set of political decision makers
in the new regime be suciently large:
Condition 2. The following holds true for all 0
t 2 M0





Condition 3 formalizes the requirement that the choice set not be too large. It stip-
ulates that every competitive equilibrium supported by 0
t, an admissible period-t policy
choice in the new policy regime and the economically equivalent continuation policy func-
tion, can also be supported in the initial regime:
Condition 3. The following holds true for all 0
t 2 M0
t and all t, where 0
t 2 ~ M0
t(t);t 2
Mt:
i. If there exists a p0
t 2 P0









t+1))) corresponding with 0
t+1, then there exists a pt 2 Pt





t+1 corresponds with the competitive equilibrium CE(t;(pt;pt(t+1))).
Note that under Condition 1, the t+1 and 0
t+1 in Condition 3 satisfy 0
t+1 2 ~ M0
t+1(t+1)











We can now state the politico-economic equivalence result:
Proposition 2. Consider a state and policy regime, (0;P) with 0 2 M0, that support
a politico-economic equilibrium PEE(0;P), and consider a new state and policy regime,
(0
0;P0) with 0
0 2 ~ M0
0(0). Suppose that Conditions 1{3 are satised. Then, under
Assumptions 1{2, (0;P) is politico-economically equivalent to (0
0;P0).
Proof. We show that there exists a politico-economic equilibrium in the new regime that




0? 1  ~ p
0 1(0
0), and the same prices, household choices and production paths as
in PEE(0;P).
Conjecture that in the new regime in period t, political decision makers as well as
the private sector expect future policy choices to be determined according to the con-
tinuation policy function ~ p
0t(). (From Condition 1, this function is well dened over
the domain M0
t+1). We claim that, under this conjecture, the policy function in the
new regime is given by ~ p0
t(). To verify the claim by contradiction, suppose instead that
the policy function is given by another function, 0




t 2 ~ M0





t+1))) is strictly pre-






t+1 corresponds with the
respective equilibrium) and 0
t(0
t) 2 P0
t. From Condition 3, there exists an admissible






cally equivalent to (t;(t;pt(t+1))) (where t+1 corresponds with the latter equilibrium).
By denition of the policy function, CE(t;pt 1(t)) is preferred (at least weakly) over
CE(t;(t;pt(t+1))). From Assumption 2, political decision makers in the new regime
share this preference. From Condition 2, political decision makers in the new regime can
support the former equilibrium by choosing ~ p0
t(0
t) rather than 0
t(0
t). This establishes
the desired contradiction and thus, veries the claim.
We conclude that for all 0
t 2 M0
t and all t, political decision makers in the new
regime implement policy choices according to the policy function ~ p0
t() if agents expect the
continuation policy function ~ p
0t(). We show next that such expectations are consistent
with equilibrium. As noted earlier, 0
t 2 ~ M0











t+1 2 ~ M0
t+1(t+1). By induction, the above argument for period t therefore extends
to subsequent periods and the conjectured expected continuation policy functions are
consistent with the policy functions governing actual policy choices. Accordingly, the
functions ~ p0
t() and ~ p
0t() satisfy the conditions of politico-economic equilibrium.





1))) and (0;(p0(0);p0(1))) (where 0
1 and
1 correspond with the respective equilibria) implies that the equilibrium policy choices
in the new policy regime support the same competitive equilibrium as in the old policy
regime. The result then follows.
Conditions 1{3 are sucient for politico-economic equivalence but not all three condi-
tions are necessary. More specically, while failure of Condition 2 necessarily undermines
politico-economic equivalence (since it implies that equivalent continuation policy func-
tions in the new regime are not admissible) the same does not hold true with respect
to Conditions 1 and 3. If the latter two conditions are violated then politico-economic
equivalence cannot be guaranteed but cannot be ruled out either. Failure of Condition 1
implies that a one-to-one relation between states cannot be established and thus, that
equivalent continuation policy functions cannot be dened. While our strategy to prove
equivalence then cannot be pursued, equivalence nevertheless may hold. Failure of Con-
dition 3 implies that some allocations may only be implementable in the new regime such
that the choice set of political decision makers in the new regime is not a subset of the
choice set in the initial regime. Equivalence still may hold since the equilibrium allocation
in the new regime may be implementable in the initial regime as well.
4.2 Non-Fundamental State Variables
Proposition 2 can be extended to accommodate trigger strategies sustained by non-
fundamental state variables. Let t represent such a non-fundamental state variable and
let St  Pt 1 denote a \proposed policy" or \suggested policy" that political decision
makers in period t are confronted with. A proposed policy contains a single pt 1 if it pre-
scribes a unique admissible policy choice in each period. Otherwise, the proposed policy
contains multiple pt 1. The non-fundamental state variable takes the value one if politi-
cal decision makers in earlier periods implemented policies consistent with the proposed
16policies they were confronted with, and zero otherwise.
In addition to the state variables contained in t, political decision makers in period
t inherit a proposed policy St as well as the non-fundamental state variable t. Given t
and St, the policy choice pt determines t+1 according to the law of motion
0 = 1 and t+1 =

1 if t = 1 and 9pt 2 Pt : (pt;pt) 2 St
0 otherwise ; t  0: (6)
Depending on the institutional setup, political decision makers in period t may choose
to modify the policy suggested to successive political decision makers. Let St+1(St) de-
note the set of proposed policies that political decision makers can choose from if they
themselves are confronted with the proposed policy St. Moreover, let hSti  Pt de-
note the policy choices contained in the set St that apply in period t + 1 or later,
hSti = fptj 9pt 2 Pt : (pt;pt) 2 Stg. If political decision makers in period t may not
modify future suggestions embedded in the proposed policy, then the choice set St+1(St)
contains a single element, hSti, and subsequent political decision makers are confronted
with essentially the same suggestion as contemporaneous ones, St+1 = hSti. If, in contrast,
the institutional setup allows political decision makers in period t to choose among a set
of proposed policies, then St+1(St) is a subset of the power set 2hSti, that is, it contains
several elements each of which is a subset of hSti. For example, if political decision makers
in period t may suggest a particular value for the policy choice in the subsequent period





A trigger strategy is dened by S  (S0;S1();S2();S3();:::). Let St+1 denote the
set of proposed policies in period t + 1 that can be generated under the trigger strategy.
This set is dened recursively as St+1 
S
St2St St+1(St) with S0 = S0.
A policy regime with trigger strategies is dened by (P;S). We denote the state
in such a policy regime by t  (t;t;St). (Both t and St become irrelevant state
variables if t = 0.) The policy functions pt() and St+1() map t  Mt  f0;1g  St
into [t2MtPt(t)  Pt and St+1, respectively, and the continuation policy function pt()
maps t+1 into [t+12Mt+1Pt(t+1)  Pt. (There is no need to specify the continuation
proposed policy function.)
Denition 7. A politico-economic equilibrium with trigger strategies as of period t con-
ditional on t 2 t as well as policy regime (P;S), denoted as PEET(t;P;S) for short,
consists of a sequence of policy functions fps()gst, a sequence of continuation policy
functions fps()gst 1, a sequence of proposed policy functions fSs()gst+1, policy choices
p?t 1, prices (q?
t;q?t;r?
t), household choices (x?
t;x?t), and production paths ffyj?
s gj2Jgst
such that
i. policy and proposed policy functions are optimal subject to continuation policy
functions:






s(s+1) for all s 2 s;s  t;
where (xs;xs) and s+1 correspond with CE(s;(ps;ps)) and s+1 follows from (6);
17ii. continuation policy functions are consistent with actual policy choices:
p
s 1(s) = (ps(s);p
s(s+1;s+1;Ss+1(s))) for all s 2 s;s  t;
where s+1 corresponds with CE(s;ps 1(s)) and s+1 follows from (6);








s gj2Jgst constitute CE(t;p?t 1).
In Appendix A.1, we extend Denitions 5{6 and Conditions 1{3 to accommodate
the state variables t and St as well as the proposed policy functions St(). Besides the
fact that the institutional environment now is characterized by both P and S, the state
is larger and political decision makers choose both policy instruments and a proposed
policy, the extended denitions and conditions dier from the original ones in a straight-
forward manner. First, associated-ness of states additionally requires that t = 0
t and
that proposed policies are economically equivalent across regimes (conditional on t;0
t).
Secondly, for the choice set of political decision makers in the new regime to be suciently
large, both the equivalent policy and the equivalent proposed policy have to be admissible
in the new regime. And nally, for the choice set of political decision makers in the new
regime not to be too large, the requirement specied in Condition 3 must be met both
for the policy choice and the proposed policy choice in the initial regime. Proposition 3
in Appendix A.1 extends the politico-economic equivalence result for pairs (0;P) and
(0
0;P0) in Proposition 2 to a result for pairs (0;P;S) and (0
0;P0;S0).
For a pair of associated states, t 2 t and 0
t 2 ~ 0
t(t), the admissible proposed




t) such that (t;St+1) is economically equivalent to (0
t;S0
t+1), and vice versa.
Two trigger strategies S and S0 then are economically equivalent (conditional on associ-
ated initial states) if for all possible subsequent pairs of associated states the admissible
proposed policies are economically equivalent. If it is known that two trigger strategies
are economically equivalent (for example because one trigger strategy was constructed to
be economically equivalent to the other), then the politico-economic equivalence condi-
tions essentially reduce to the conditions that must be satised in the case without trigger
strategies.
5 Applications
We now show how the theoretical framework developed above can be put to work. We
consider two types of environments where public debt plays a central role. First, an envi-
ronment with overlapping generations where debt repayment transfers resources between
cohorts, parallel to social security benets. And second, an environment where debt serves
to smooth tax distortions.
18In addition to the notation introduced in the previous sections, and unless otherwise
noted, we let wt, lt and li
t denote the wage, labor supply of the representative worker,
and labor supply of type i (or household i) in period t, respectively; kt the capital stock
per worker; Iw
t and Ir
t the set of workers and retirees, respectively; gw
t () and gr
t() tax
functions imposed on workers and retirees, respectively; and  the gross population growth
rate.
5.1 Debt Repayment as Transfer
We start by contrasting politico-economic theories of social security on the one hand and
debt on the other. Based on our theoretical results, we show that certain politico-economic
theories of social security that have been proposed in the literature may be re-interpreted
as politico-economic theories of government debt. Beyond these novel theories, the anal-
ysis generates three general insights. First, it identies an important class of economic
environments in which politico-economic equivalence between social security and debt
regimes holds robustly (that is, independently of particular political aggregation mech-
anisms). Second, it shows how the equivalence conditions can be employed to develop
novel theories even in those environments in which politico-economic equivalence may not
generally be guaranteed. And nally, it proves that with a sucient degree of hetero-
geneity among households and absent commitment, the conditions for politico-economic
equivalence generally are undermined unless certain exogenous restrictions are imposed.
5.1.1 Robust Politico-Economic Equivalence
We start by characterizing a baseline setup in which politico-economic equivalence of a
social security and a debt regime is guaranteed for arbitrary political aggregation mech-
anisms. The economy is inhabited by two-period lived overlapping generations that are
homogeneous within cohorts; the number of young relative to old households is denoted
t. Young households inelastically supply labor and production is neoclassical. In a rst
step, we analyze the case without commitment and trigger strategies. The state then only
includes the capital stock, kt.
A social security regime is characterized by a labor income tax levied at rate t and
funding transfers to retirees.15 An alternative policy regime with debt is characterized by
the repayment rate z0
t, the exogenous debt stock per retiree  b0
t > 0 and labor income taxes
levied at rate 0
t. (To streamline notation, we do not distinguish between debt repayment
in periods t  1 and \debt repayment" to retirees in the initial period who did not
purchase the debt but simply receive a transfer.) Since retirees are homogeneous within
a cohort, the cross section of debt holdings among living households is fully characterized
by  b0
t.
15With inelastic labor supply and within-cohort homogeneity, labor income taxes are equivalent to
lump sum taxes. Below, when introducing tax distortions and within-cohort heterogeneity, this is no
longer the case. We specify labor income rather than lump sum taxes already at this point to render the
dierent setups more easily comparable.
19Table 1 summarizes the two policy regimes. The social security regime is characterized
on top of the left column, the debt regime on top of the right column. The lower part
of the Table summarizes the economic-equivalence cross-regime restrictions implied by
Proposition 1. These \EE restrictions" require in each period identical capital stocks and
government cash ows across regimes, and for each cohort identical present values of tax
payments across regimes.
gw




t; t  0
gr
t(wt) =  ttwt; t  0 gr0
0 =   b0
0z0
0; gr0
t = 0; t  1
Pt = ft 2 R+g; t  0 P0
t = f(0
t;z0
t) 2 R  R+g; t  0
S = ; S0 = ;
t = kt; t  0 0
t = (k0
t; b0
t); t  0
EE restrictions, 0
t k0




s = ssws= b0
s; s  t
0




ws ; s  t
Table 1: Setup with robust politico-economic equivalence.
To assess politico-economic equivalence note rst (from the EE restrictions in Table 1)
that any state kt 2 Mt and admissible continuation policy sequence t 1 in the social
security regime (not only the equilibrium continuation policy sequence t 1(kt)) is eco-




0t 1 in the debt regime. Associated states therefore satisfy k0
t = kt for all kt 2 Mt. In




0t 1. As long as k0
0 = k0, any state that may result under some feasible
policy sequence in the social security regime therefore may also result under a feasible
policy sequence in the debt regime, Mt  M0
t. A parallel argument relating states across
the two regimes in the opposite direction establishes that M0
t  Mt. We conclude that
if k0
0 = k0, then Mt = M0
t and Condition 1 is satised regardless of whether the initial
regime is the social security regime or the debt regime.
Condition 2 is satised as well regardless of the initial regime. This follows immediately
from the fact that equivalent continuation policy sequences are admissible, both in the
debt regime and the social security regime, as argued above. In fact, a stronger condition
than Condition 2 is satised because the equivalent continuation policy sequences of arbi-
trary admissible policy sequences (not only the equilibrium continuation policy sequence)
are admissible, and this holds true regardless of the initial regime. But this stricter ver-
sion of Condition 2 for the debt regime as the initial regime is equivalent to Condition 3
for the social security regime, and vice versa. As long as k0
0 = k0, Conditions 1{3 then are
all satised and politico-economic equivalence is guaranteed. Note that this conclusion
does not rely on assumptions about the political aggregator function. In the baseline
setup, politico-economic equivalence therefore is guaranteed for any political aggregator
20function. Essentially, this generality follows from the fact that the EE restrictions can be
satised for all admissible rather than just the equilibrium continuation policy sequences.
Forni (2005) analyzes the baseline setup under the assumption that a median voter
is politically decisive. He shows that, for some parameter constellations, an equilibrium
with self-fullling expectations may exist in which strictly positive social security tax rates
are sustained. Contemporaneous political decision makers support strictly positive taxes
if they expect future social security benets to be a decreasing function of the capital
stock.16 From the above discussion, we can immediately conclude that the social security
regime in Forni's (2005) model is politico-economically equivalent (conditional on some
initial capital stock) to a debt regime.
The general equivalence result for the baseline setup extends to the case with one-
period, symmetric commitment. In this case, the state in the social security regime is
given by t = (kt;t) and in the debt regime by 0
t = (k0
t;z0
t). The EE restrictions in Table 1
continue to hold, with the exception that t and z0
t are part of the respective states rather
than the continuation policy sequences from period t 1 onwards. With this qualication,
and as long as k0
0 = k0 and z0
0 = 00w0= b0
0, all arguments establishing the validity of
Conditions 1{3 in the case without commitment extend to the situation with one-period,
symmetric commitment. Politico-economic equivalence therefore is guaranteed for any
political aggregator function.
The general equivalence result for the baseline setup also extends to the case with
trigger strategies. In a social security regime with trigger strategy S, political decision
makers in period t are confronted with a suggested policy St and choose the suggested
policy St+1. Politico-economic equivalence in this setup is guaranteed if k0
0 = k0 and 0
0 =
0 and if the trigger strategy in the social security regime, S, is economically equivalent
to the trigger strategy in the debt regime, S0. In the absence of a priori restrictions on
the latter trigger strategy, this requirement can easily be satised by constructing an





to each t 2 t.
Boldrin and Rustichini (2000) analyze the baseline setup with a trigger strategy under
the assumption that a young median voter is politically decisive. They assume that
political decision makers are confronted with a suggested policy St consisting of a set
of continuation policies t 1 with t xed according to the suggestion made by political
decision makers in period t   1. In turn, political decision makers in period t choose
an updated suggested policy St+1 = ft 2 hStijt+1 = 
sug
t+1g that is characterized by a
particular proposal for the tax rate in the subsequent period, 
sug
t+1. Boldrin and Rustichini
(2000) show that this trigger strategy provides suciently strong incentives for political
decision makers to support equilibria with strictly positive social security transfers. From
the above discussion, we can immediately conclude that the social security regime in
Boldrin and Rustichini's (2000) model is politico-economically equivalent to the debt
regime (conditional on some initial capital stock and 0
0 = 0) if the trigger strategy in
the debt regime is appropriately specied. In particular, equivalence is guaranteed if for
each pair of associated states t and 0
t the trigger strategy in the debt regime satises
16Forni (2005) considers the case where the initial capital stock evolves within a certain range of










t+1 is part of the continuation policy sequence
that is economically equivalent to the continuation policy sequence containing 
sug
t+1.
5.1.2 Fragile Politico-Economic Equivalence
In the setup with robust politico-economic equivalence, the equivalent continuation policy
sequences of arbitrary admissible policy sequences are themselves admissible. As a con-
sequence, Conditions 2 and 3 are satised independently of a specic political aggregator
function. With extensions to the baseline setup, in contrast, the equivalent continuation
policy sequences of only some but not all admissible policy sequences may themselves
be admissible, and Conditions 2 or 3 may therefore only be satised for specic political
aggregator functions. We refer to this situation as \fragile" politico-economic equivalence.
For a simple but important extension of the baseline setup with fragile politico-
economic equivalence, consider the case with elastic labor supply. Maintaining the as-
sumption of proportional labor income taxes, economic equivalence now requires that the
marginal tax rate for each cohort be identical across regimes (in addition to the restric-
tions of identical capital stocks, government cash ows, and lifetime tax burdens across
regimes). In general, to satisfy this requirement necessitates two tax instruments. Table 2
summarizes a social-security regime on the left-hand side and a debt regime on the right-
hand side with two such instruments. The admissibility restrictions on these instruments
rule out lump-sum taxes. The rst tax, raised at rate t or 0
t, transfers resources from
workers to retirees (by means of social security benets or debt repayment). The second
one, raised at rate t or 0
t, is a purely distorting tax whose proceeds are redistributed
lump-sum among workers. The EE restrictions capture the restrictions on households'
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Table 2: Setup with fragile politico-economic equivalence.
Note that every possible state in either of the two regimes is associated with a unique
state in the other regime, i.e. ~ M0
t(kt) = kt and ~ Mt(k0
t) = k0
t. Moreover, in either of the
22two regimes the set of possible states in period t|the set of possible capital stocks kt that
can be attained by admissible and feasible policies|ranges from zero (the capital stock
subject to conscatory taxation) to a maximum value,  kt(k0) or  kt(k0
0). Since the latter
results in the absence of any taxation, we have  kt(k0) =  kt(k0
0) as long as k0 = k0
0. As
a consequence, Mt = M0
t and Condition 1 is satised, regardless of whether the initial
regime is the social security regime or the debt regime.
Consider next Condition 2. For any admissible policy sequence (and thus, for the
equilibrium policy sequence under any political aggregator function) in the social security
regime the equivalent policy sequence in the debt regime is admissible as well because
s;s  0 for all s  t implies that z0
s;0
s  0 and 0
s 2 R for all s  t. Condition 2
therefore holds for any political aggregator function if the initial regime is the social
security regime.
In contrast, this is not the case if the initial regime is the debt regime. There ex-
ist admissible and feasible policy sequences in the debt regime whose equivalent policy
sequences are not admissible in the social security regime. To see this, consider an admis-




t), that supports wages
and labor supplies, w0
s;l0
s;s  t, (conditional on k0
t and the continuation policy function
p
0t()). If the political aggregator function implies z0
t+1 > 0 under the continuation policy
function p
0t(), then one feasible policy choice p0
t involves contemporaneous total tax rate
0
t + 0
t = 0 and contemporaneous debt repayment z0
t > 0 (which can be nanced out of
new debt issues because z0
t+1 > 0). From the EE restrictions, the economically equivalent






t) < 0, which is
not admissible. Condition 2 therefore does not hold for every political aggregator function
when the initial regime is the debt regime.
This has direct implications for the validity of Condition 3. If the initial regime is
the social security regime then this condition does not hold for every political aggregator
function. For example, suppose that the equilibrium continuation policy function in
the social security regime species a positive tax rate t+1 (depending on the political
aggregator function, this is clearly possible). From the EE restrictions, this translates
into a positive debt repayment rate z0
t+1 under the equivalent continuation policy function
in the debt regime. The previous reasoning then applies; certain allocations can be
implemented in the debt regime but cannot be supported in the social security regime.
Condition 3 therefore does not hold in this example.
Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2008) analyze the setup with endogenous labor supply
and social security under the assumption that preferences are aggregated through prob-
abilistic voting. They show that strictly positive social security transfers are sustained
in politico-economic equilibrium. As argued above, these transfers translate into positive
debt repayment rates under the equivalent continuation policy function in the debt regime
and imply that politico-economic equivalence cannot be guaranteed.17
17In fact, politico-economic equivalence fails in Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt's (2008) model. In their
model, the tax rate t sometimes is in a corner. Without the non-negativity constraint on t, a dierent
policy would be implemented and thus, a dierent allocation supported. This dierent allocation would
also be supported in the debt regime where the admissibility restrictions are less tight. Since the equi-
librium allocation supported in the debt regime (or the social security regime with relaxed admissibility
23The opposite conclusion follows in the setup with endogenous labor supply and social
security if one assumes that a median voter is politically decisive and that this median
voter is a young household. Restricting attention to (the limit of) a nite horizon economy,
the equilibrium social security tax rate then satises s = 0 in all periods s  t. In this
case, politico-economic equivalence therefore is guaranteed.18
It is frequently argued that pre-funding of social security (a shift from a social security
regime to a debt regime) improves outcomes by reducing labor supply distortions. This
argument relies on the assumption, which often remains implicit, that certain competitive
equilibria may be supported by admissible debt policies but not by admissible social
security policies, that is, the argument presupposes violations of economic equivalence.19
Our conclusion regarding the failure of politico-economic equivalence diers from that
standard argument but is related. According to our conclusion, political decision makers
in a debt regime have larger choice sets. This has two implications. First, if the restriction
to smaller choice sets is binding, then political decision makers may implement more
distorting policies in a social security regime than in a debt regime. Second, this may
generate political support for a regime change towards pre-funding.
We have seen that in a setup with endogenous labor supply and social security, a
politico-economic equilibrium may not necessarily be re-interpreted as an equilibrium in a
debt regime. Nevertheless, a researcher wishing to characterize the politico-economic equi-
librium in a debt regime may be able to rely on our equivalence result. In particular, a sim-
ple strategy to that end consists in rst characterizing the politico-economic equilibrium
in a social security regime subject to relaxed admissibility restrictions, (t;t) 2 R+  R
rather than (t;t) 2 R2
+. If the policy sequences in the debt regime that are economically
equivalent to the equilibrium policy sequences in the relaxed social security regime are
admissible (such that Condition 2 is satised), then politico-economic equivalence holds20
and the equilibrium allocation characterized in the relaxed social security regime also
constitutes the equilibrium allocation in the debt regime.
5.1.3 Breakdown of Politico-Economic Equivalence
If heterogeneity may be reected in a non-trivial debt ownership structure, and absent
commitment to the repayment rate, politico-economic equivalence generally fails. Con-
sider an environment with debt where households within a cohort are non-representative
or where households live for more than two periods. The debt ownership structure then is
restrictions) cannot be supported in the social security regime with the original admissibility restrictions,
Condition 3 specically is violated for the equilibrium policy under the debt regime. This implies that
politico-economic equivalence fails.
18From the EE restrictions, zero tax rates s imply ~ p
0t(k0








t+1 = kt+1. With future debt repayment rates at zero, no funds can be raised
from debt issuance and any feasible policy in the debt regime must nance contemporaneous debt repay-






t must be non-negative, the tax rate
0
t  0. As a consequence, the economically equivalent policy choice in the social security regime satises
t = 0
t  0 and t = 0
t  0 which does not violate any admissibility restriction.
19See Feldstein and Liebman (2002) for an overview over the literature and Rangel (1997) for an
insightful critical analysis of this argument.
20Condition 3 necessarily holds as well in this case.
24endogenous (in contrast to a setup with homogeneous, two-period lived households) and
without commitment, it constitutes a state variable because it determines the extent to
which a change in the repayment rate aects the wealth distribution.21 In such an envi-
ronment, the set of implementable policies thus varies with an endogenous state variable
that is not present in a social security regime. Evidently, this discrepancy generally would
undermine Condition 3. More fundamentally, it undermines Condition 1.
To see how an endogenous, non-trivial debt ownership structure undermines Condi-
tion 1 in the absence of commitment, consider a state t = fai
tgi2It in a social security
regime.22 This state is associated with the state 0
t = fai0
t ;bi0
t gi2It in a debt regime if there
exists an admissible continuation debt policy p
0t 1 such that the following conditions are
satised:


















all i 2 Is;s  t;




t) di = 0.
Here, NTF
i
t(;t;pt 1) denotes the \net tax function" for household i 2 Is;s  t, in period
t. This net tax function gives the present value of taxes net of transfers of household i as a
function of i's choices in period t and later; it is parameterized by the state (which includes
asset holdings), the continuation policy as well as prices and interest rates which in turn
depend on the state and the continuation policy through the equilibrium allocation.
Suppose that the state t in a social security regime is associated with some state 
01
t
in a debt regime. (If no such state 
01
t exists, then Condition 1 ii. is violated and we do
not need to proceed further.) Suppose further that another state ^ t in the social security
regime|dierent from t but with the same capital stock as t (that is,
R
i2It ai
t di = R
i2It ^ ai
t di and CE(t;pt 1(t)) 6= CE(^ t;pt 1(^ t)))|is associated with some other state

02
t in the debt regime. (Dito.) The following conditions then hold:






















01;t 1) for all i 2 Is;s  t;
and some admissible p















02;t 1) for all i 2 Is;s  t;
and some admissible p
02;t 1 (and thus z
02
t ).
21With commitment to the repayment rate, debt holdings do not constitute a separate state variable
(see the discussion on page 11). Cukierman and Meltzer (1989) analyze a model with social security
and debt where political decision makers can commit to policy instruments one period in advance. They
show that voters are indierent between using debt or social security as instruments for intergenerational
redistribution.












































Generically, such a 0






























t    b0
t) di = 0. The capital stock in
state 0
t therefore corresponds with the capital stock in state 
01
t (or in state 
02
t ); debt
markets clear in state 0
t; each household's nancial wealth under (0
t;p
01;t 1) corresponds
to its nancial wealth under (
01
t ;p
01;t 1); and each household's nancial wealth under
(0
t;p





associated with both t and ^ t. We conclude that Condition 1 iii. necessarily is violated









holds generically). Clearly, this negative result may be overturned if exogenous restrictions
on the ownership structure of debt are imposed.24
The possibility of an endogenous, non-trivial debt ownership structure arises in the
environment considered by Tabellini (2000). He analyzes a two-period lived overlapping
generations economy with inelastic labor supply, exogenous average labor productivity wt,
heterogeneous time endowments among young households, and no capital nor government
debt. Household heterogeneity renders the social security system with its tax on labor
income t redistributive.25 There is no commitment and no trigger strategy. Tabellini
(2000) shows that, in a median voter framework with weak intergenerational altruism, a
coalition of poor young and old households may sustain a social security system whose
size increases with the degree of inequality, but decreases with the rate of population
growth .
Cooley and Soares (1999) analyze a four-period lived overlapping generations economy
with capital accumulation, within-cohort homogeneity and a pay-as-you-go nanced social
security system with proportional taxes levied on the labor income of workers (households
during their rst three periods of life) and distributed in a lump-sum fashion among
retirees (households during their last period of life). Cooley and Soares (1999) analyze the
politico-economic equilibrium under the assumption that the median voter in the initial
23The 0













t ). See, for example, Mas-Colell et al. (1995, p. 593).
24For example, one may restrict debt issuance to be symmetric across certain types of households, or
targeted to some but not others, and impose that secondary markets be closed.
25Tabellini (2000) assumes proportional taxes levied on the young and a lump-sum benet paid to
the old. To be of relevance for our discussion, Tabellini's (2000) model must be extended to allow for
linear rather than proportional taxes, due to economic equivalence considerations. For in a social security
regime with proportional taxes and lump-sum benets lifetime taxes of a household are a linear function
of income during young age. Replicating households' budget sets in a debt regime (without old-age
benets) thus requires a linear tax function.
26period chooses a tax rate that serves as time-invariant proposed social security tax rate in
all subsequent periods. Successive median voters only choose between implementing the
proposed tax rate or dismantling the social security system forever. Numerically solving
a calibrated version of their model, Cooley and Soares (1999) nd that the median voter
is of age two (out of four) and sustains positive intergenerational transfers.
For the general reasons discussed above, politico-economic equivalence between a so-
cial security and debt regime fails in Tabellini's (2000) and Cooley and Soares's (1999)
environments. To satisfy Condition 1 and possibly guarantee equivalence, debt holdings
could be restricted to be symmetric across retirees (in the former model) or to be targeted
to workers in their last period before retirement (in the latter). But even if debt could
be issued in accordance with these restrictions, secondary markets could easily compro-
mise those eorts as government promises would tend to be reallocated to the politically
most inuential investors (Broner, Martin and Ventura, 2010). In general, this would
undermine Condition 1.
5.2 Debt as Tax Smoothing Device
We have seen in the previous subsection that in certain environments, economic equiv-
alence of social security and debt policies extends to the political sphere in the sense
that social security and debt regimes are politico-economically equivalent. It is natural
to ask whether a similar result holds when debt serves a purpose other than transferring
resources across groups. One such alternative purpose concerns the role of debt as a tax
smoothing device (Barro, 1979; Lucas and Stokey, 1983). An important economic equiv-
alence result in environments with distorting taxes states that tax-and-debt policies that
dier with respect to the timing but not the present value of tax collections can be eco-
nomically equivalent (Bassetto and Kocherlakota, 2004). We ask whether this economic
equivalence result in environments with distorting taxes extends to the political sphere
and nd that this is not the case.26
For simplicity, we rst abstract from capital accumulation and focus on tax-and-debt
policies that tax labor income at a proportional rate. As Bassetto and Kocherlakota
(2004) show, variations in the timing of tax collections and the associated debt path need
not alter the equilibrium allocation even if taxes are distorting as long as taxes on lagged
labor income are admissible. Consider for example the case where labor income in period
t might either be taxed at rate t;t in period t or both at rate 0
t;t in period t and at
rate 0
t;t+1 in period t + 1. If t;t = 0
t;t + rt;t+10
t;t+1, switching from the former to the
latter tax policy changes the timing of tax collections and the level of debt but does not
alter eective marginal or average tax rates on period t labor income. A policy change of
this kind therefore preserves households' budget sets and the equilibrium allocation. In
26We consider the case with and without commitment. Absent commitment, debt does not only serve
as a tax smoothing device but may also redistribute wealth.
















for all i 2 I; s  t;
where li
t denotes labor supply of household i.
Consider now the situation with sequential decision making, and suppose rst that
governments cannot commit to debt repayment. The initial policy regime with contem-
poraneous taxes only is characterized by Pt = f(t;t;zt) 2 R  R+g and the new policy




t) 2 R2  R+g. In
the initial regime, t = fbi
tgi2I while in the new regime, the state is composed of debt
holdings as well as lagged labor supply, 0
t = fbi0
t ;li0
t 1gi2I. (For simplicity, wages are
exogenous and not included in the state.)
Condition 1 iii. fails in this environment because two dierent states in the initial
regime, t = fbi
tgi2I and ^ t = f^ bi
tgi2I say, can be associated with one and the same state
in the new regime. This can be shown by following the same strategy as in subsubsection
5.1.3. If t is associated with some state 
01
t and ^ t with some state 
02
































for all i 2 I (7)
is associated with both t and ^ t since each household's nancial wealth net of lump





01;t 1) coincide and the same holds true for nan-






equivalence therefore is not guaranteed.27
Suppose next that governments can commit to debt repayment such that the state is
given by fztbi
tgi2I in the initial regime and by fz0
tbi0
t ;li0
t 1gi2I in the new regime. The admis-





R2  R+g but Condition 1 iii. continues to be violated. Following a parallel argument as
above, a 0







t on the right-hand side of the equations being replaced by  z0
tbi0
t since
the repayment rate now is part of the state.
Note that our simplifying assumptions according to which taxes are proportional and
the economy does not feature capital are not restrictive as they do not aect the previous
arguments. Even if both regimes allowed for a lump sum tax, Condition 1 iii. would
still be violated. (Equation (7) would feature a constant on both sides of the equations
27Under the assumption of a representative agent (which is of little relevance in the politico-economic
context), the state in the initial regime could only take one value, rendering it impossible for a state
in the new regime to be associated with more than one state in the initial regime. Condition 1 iii.
would therefore be satised. Condition 2 would also be satised since allocations supported by the




s) = (s;s;0;zs). In contrast, Condition 3 would be violated since in the new regime, negative
net transfers could be implemented while this is not possible in the initial regime (where it would require
zt < 0). Politico-economic equivalence therefore could still not be guaranteed.
28in that case.) The crucial factor undermining Condition 1 iii. is that the tax on lagged
income is both non distorting at the time it is levied and a function of a tax base that
varies across households. This generates the exchangeability of debt holdings and the
tax base which lies at the source of the violation of Condition 1 iii. We conclude that
politico-economic equivalence generically fails in environments of the type considered by
Bassetto and Kocherlakota (2004). Battaglini and Coate (2008) and Yared (2010) contain
politico-economic models of government debt in environments with tax distortions.28 Our
results indicate that the equilibria in these models cannot be re-interpreted as equilibria
in models where taxes are additionally raised on lagged income.
6 Conclusions
We have derived general conditions for economic and politico-economic equivalence. We
have applied these conditions in the context of well-known models in the literature with
the aim to understand why a change of policy regime might matter in politico-economic
equilibrium even if policies in these regimes are equivalent from a purely economic point
of view.
Exploiting economic equivalence relations, our sucient conditions for politico-economic
equivalence rely on an intuitive comparison of choice sets faced by political decision mak-
ers. As these choice sets are constrained by the state on the one hand and the policy
instruments under the control of political decision makers on the other, the politico-
economic equivalence conditions impose restrictions on the state and policy spaces across
policy regimes.
The equivalence conditions provide a powerful tool to analyze politico-economic mod-
els of scal policy. When applied to an environment with overlapping generations, they
identify classes of models with dierent equivalence properties as far as social security
and debt regimes are concerned. In one such class|characterized by minimal household
heterogeneity and non distorting taxes|politico-economic equivalence between social se-
curity and debt regimes holds independently of particular political aggregation mecha-
nisms. In another class|characterized by sucient heterogeneity among households and
no commitment|the cross-regime state space restrictions are violated and social secu-
rity and debt regimes generally are not politico-economically equivalent. In a third class,
politico-economic equivalence of social security and debt regimes may or may not hold,
depending on the political aggregation mechanism in place. In this class, the cross-regime
state space restrictions are satised but dierentially tight admissibility restrictions on
policy instruments may undermine equivalence.
These results establish that certain politico-economic theories of social security that
have been proposed in the literature may be re-interpreted as politico-economic theories
of government debt. Moreover, by identifying factors that undermine politico-economic
equivalence, the results can help rationalize why interest groups might favor or oppose
the privatization of social security even if from a purely economic point of view, such a
28Our analysis can easily accommodate endogenous (or exogenous) government spending as featured
in these models.
29regime change appears irrelevant. We expect this to prove useful in constructing theories of
social security reform, as we intend to do in future research. Finally, the results show that
although certain social security regimes in existing models are not politico-economically
equivalent to debt regimes, suitably modied versions of the social security regimes can
be used to easily characterize politico-economic equilibria in debt regimes.29
When applied to environments with tax distortions, our results make clear that an
important economic equivalence relation does not extend to the political sphere. From a
purely economic point of view, the net present value of distorting taxes on households'
budget sets determines the equilibrium allocation and the exact timing of tax collections
often is irrelevant. From a politico-economic point of view, in contrast, timing considera-
tions are crucial.
The applicability of our equivalence conditions extends beyond the particular envi-
ronments we considered and it is not conned to the realm of scal policy. Before the
background of an appropriately dened equivalence class of policies|be they scal, mon-
etary or other|the conditions may be applied to any model featuring an endogenous
choice of such policies.
A Appendix
A.1 Non-Fundamental State Variables
In the presence of trigger strategies, the denitions of politico-economic equivalence and
associated states need slight adjustment (cf. Denitions 5 and 6):
Denition 8. A state and policy regime with trigger strategies, (t;P;S), is politico-
economically equivalent to another state and policy regime with trigger strategies, (0
t;P0;S0),
if
i. (t;P;S) supports a politico-economic equilibrium with trigger strategies PEET(t;P;S)
with policy choices p?t 1;
ii. (0
t;P0;S0) supports a politico-economic equilibrium with trigger strategies PEET(0
t;P0;S0)
with policy choices p
0?t 1;
iii. (t;p?t 1) is economically equivalent to (0
t;p
0?t 1).
Denition 9. For a state t 2 t in the policy regime with trigger strategies (P;S), an
associated state 0
t in the policy regime with trigger strategies (P0;S0) satises
i. tp0
t is part of a tp0 2 tQ0;
ii. there exists a p
0t 1 2 Q




29In future work, we intend to pursue this strategy using Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt's (2008) model of
social security dynamics (with suitably adjusted admissibility restrictions) to understand the dynamics






v. (t;St) is economically equivalent to (0
t;S0
t).
The set of states in the policy regime with trigger strategies (P0;S0) that are associated
with t 2 t is denoted ~ 0
t(t).
The rst two requirements in Denition 9 parallel the requirements in Denition 6. The
third requirement postulates that the state variables summarizing adherence to proposed
policies in the past be identical across regimes. The nal two requirements guarantee that
the proposed policies allow for the same set of competitive equilibria across regimes. If
~ 0
t(t) is empty for some t, then the policy instruments or the trigger strategy in the
new policy regime are not exible enough to support the equilibrium allocation given t
in the initial policy regime, even disregarding numerical restrictions on the instruments.
Conditions 1{3 may now be adjusted accordingly.
Condition 4. The following holds true for all t:
i. 0
t  [t2t~ 0
t(t);
ii. ~ 0
t(t) 6= ; for all t 2 t;
iii. if t  (t;t;St); ^ t  (^ t; ^ t; ^ St) 2 t and CE(t;pt 1(t)) 6= CE(^ t;pt 1(^ t)) then
~ 0
t(t) \ ~ 0
t(^ t) = ;.
If Condition 4 is satised, we can again dene an equivalent continuation policy func-
tion ~ p
0t 1() and equivalent policy function ~ p0
t() that map the state 0
t into a continua-
tion policy choice ~ p
0t 1(0
t) 2 Q




functions have domain [t2t~ 0
t(t). Moreover, we can dene an equivalent proposed
policy function ~ S0
t+1() that maps the state 0
t 2 [t2t~ 0




0t by letting ~ S0
t+1(0
t) be the set of continuation policies p
0t in the new policy




t 2 ~ 0
t(t).
As before, we disregard the possibility that the equivalent continuation policy function or
the equivalent policy function are correspondences.
Condition 5 formalizes the requirement that the choice set of political decision makers
in the new regime be suciently large. Relative to Condition 2, Condition 5 adds the
requirement that the equivalent proposed policy be admissible in the new policy regime:
Condition 5. The following holds true for all 0
t 2 0









Condition 6 formalizes the requirement that the choice set not be too large:
Condition 6. The following holds true for all 0
t 2 0
t and all t, where 0
t 2 ~ 0
t(t);t 2 t:



















t+1), then there exists a pt 2 Pt and St+1 2 St+1(St) such that





(ii) (t+1;St+1) is economically equivalent to (0
t+1;S0
t+1)
where t+1 = (t+1;t+1;St+1) corresponds with the competitive equilibrium CE(t;(pt;pt(t+1))).
Note that under Condition 4, the t+1 and 0
t+1 in Condition 6 satisfy 0
t+1 2 ~ 0
t+1(t+1),











t+1)), in parallel to the case without trigger strategies. Second, t+1 = 0
t+1 be-
cause of 0
t 2 ~ 0





on the one hand and (t;St) and (0
t;S0
t) on the other. Third, (t+1;St+1) is economically
equivalent to (0
t+1;S0
t+1) by Condition 6 (ii).
We can now state the extended equivalence result:
Proposition 3. Consider a state and policy regime with trigger strategies, (0;P;S) with
0 2 0, that support a politico-economic equilibrium with trigger strategies PEET(0;P;S),
and consider a new state and policy regime with trigger strategies, (0
0;P0;S0) with
0
0 2 ~ 0
0(0). Suppose that Conditions 4{6 are satised. Then, under Assumptions 1{2,
(0;P;S) is politico-economically equivalent to (0
0;P0;S0).
Proof. We show that there exists a politico-economic equilibrium in the new regime that




the policy choices p
0? 1  ~ p
0 1(0
0), and the same prices, household choices and production
paths as in PEET(0;P;S).
The logic of the proof follows the one of Proposition 2. Assumption 2 and Conditions 4{
6 imply that, for all 0
t 2 0
t and all t, political decision makers in the new regime
implement policy and proposed policy choices according to the policy and proposed policy
functions ~ p0
t() and ~ S0
t+1() respectively, if agents expect the continuation policy function
~ p
0t(). Such expectations are consistent with equilibrium. For, as noted above, 0
t 2
0
t(t) and implementation of equivalent (proposed) policies implies 0
t+1 2 0
t+1(t+1).
By induction, the continuation policy functions are consistent with the policy functions
governing actual policy choices. Accordingly, the functions ~ p0
t(), ~ p
0t() and ~ S0
t+1() satisfy
the conditions of politico-economic equilibrium.





1))) and (0;(p0(0);p0(1))) (where 0
1 and
1 correspond with the respective equilibria) implies that the equilibrium policy choices
in the new policy regime support the same competitive equilibrium as in the old policy
regime. The result then follows.
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